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Abstract 
Corporate taxes exert a variety of effects on business behaviour. A wealth of 
empirical evidence assesses the magnitude of these behavioural margins of taxation. 
This article offers an up-to-date review and aims to provide common ground by 
computing for each distortion the semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base. We pay 
particular attention to international investment where it is not a priory clear whether 
marginal investment decisions or discrete locations are most important. Using an 
extension of the meta analysis of De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), we explore the 
extent to which existing studies reveal differences in effect size between the 
intensive and extensive margins of international investment.  
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1 0BINTRODUCTION 
Corporate taxes influence business behaviour in several ways. For instance, firms exploit tax 
arbitrage opportunities between legal forms; they switch between debt and equity finance or 
reduce investment in response to tax; and multinationals can choose to allocate their income in 
foreign affiliates or modify their location decisions. On the quantitative importance of each of 
these behavioural margins of taxation is a wealth of empirical evidence. There is, however, little 
common ground for comparing the size of different distortions. This article offers an up-to-date 
review of empirical studies on various decision margins and compares them by computing the 
impact of different margins on a nations’ corporate tax base. 
We pay special attention to international investment choices. Theory is ambiguous on 
whether international investment is driven primarily by the company tax burden at the margin 
of new investment or by the average tax burden on company profits, which applies to e.g. 
discrete location choice. We extend the meta data base of De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and 
perform meta regressions to assess the differential tax effect at the intensive and extensive 
investment margins.  
Quantitative insight in the size of various tax margins is important for normative questions 
regarding the optimal design of corporate tax systems. For instance, to minimise distortions in 
organisational form, the government should reduce tax differences between corporate and non-
corporate firms. Large debt-equity distortions provide an argument for a neutral tax treatment of 
interest and dividend. If marginal investment distortions are substantial, then a tax system that 
minimizes the effective marginal tax rate is more desirable, which typically calls for a narrow 
base and a high rate. However, if profit shifting and discrete location choices are relatively 
important, policies that reduce statutory tax rates are likely to be more efficient. Knowledge 
about the magnitude of different tax margins may also help to answer positive questions. For 
instance, it may explain recent developments in corporate tax systems in the OECD.  
This article starts in section 2 by explaining the idea of tax base elasticities. It then assesses 
these elasticities at four decision margins. Section 3 analyses international investments in more 
detail by performing a meta analysis. Section 4 presents our final assessment. 
2 1BCORPORATE TAX ELASTICITIES 
The revenue implications of corporate tax changes can be illustrated by the Laffer curve. 
Clausing (2007) estimates Laffer curves for corporate taxes in a group of OECD countries and 
finds that the top is achieved at a rate of 33%. This result can be rephrased in terms of the semi-
elasticity of the corporate tax base, which measures the percentage change in the corporate tax 
base in response to a 1%-point change in the tax rate. If we denote Bj as the jth component of the 
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corporate tax base and τj as the corporate tax rate applicable to that base, then total corporate tax 
revenue equals: 
∑=
j
jj BT τ  (1) 
Totally differentiating with respect to the tax rate yields for the change in corporate tax revenue: 
∑ +=
j
jjjj dBdT τετ ]1[  (2) 
where εj denotes the semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base, defined as jjjj BB /)/( τε ∂∂= . 
If the top of the Laffer curve (dT = 0) is obtained when τ = 0.33, expression (2) suggests that the 
semi-elasticity of the tax base is − 3. Hence, a 1%-point increase in the corporate tax rate would 
reduce the corporate tax base by 3%. This effect may run via several behavioural responses. 
The analysis in this paper tries to assess which margins are quantitatively most important. In 
particular, we split the aggregate semi-elasticity of the tax base in (2) into five different parts: 
LOCFINVNPSMDENOF wwww εεεεεε ++++=  (3) 
where the semi-elasticities refer to, respectively, the choice of organisational form (εOF ), the 
response in the debt-equity ratio (εDE), multinational profit shifting (εPS ), the investment 
distortion (εINV ) and the inframarginal effect on location choices (εLOC ). The last four semi-
elasticities are pre-multiplied by shares because the behavioural response refers to a part of the 
corporate tax base. The variables wN, wM, and wF stand for, respectively, the share of normal 
return on equity in the total corporate tax base (which comprises also economic rents), the share 
of profits made by multinationals, and the share of assets owned by foreigners. Our aim is to 
collect information about the ε’s from existing empirical literature and combine this with 
information about the various shares. Thus, we disentangle the aggregate tax base elasticity into 
five components. 
For each decision margin in (3), this section provides a short review of recent empirical 
studies, sometimes by referring to and extending earlier literature reviews. Moreover, we pay 
attention to the shares wN, wM and wF. Note that the approach of partial tax base elasticities does 
neither justice to specific circumstances in practice e.g. in certain countries, sectors or times, 
nor does it take away uncertainty about effect sizes. Moreover, it only captures partial effects, 
not (general equilibrium) interactions. The purpose is to translate insights from empirical 
studies into policy-relevant indicators measuring the size of distortions induced by corporate 
taxation. 
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2.1 4BLegal form 
In most countries, incomes earned in sole proprietorships are subject to personal income tax. 
Incomes earned in (closely or widely held) corporations are first subject to corporate income tax 
and are then possibly taxed again at the personal level via taxes on profit distributions or 
realized capital gains (whereby sometimes double-tax relief is applied). The different tax 
treatment of corporate versus non-corporate income creates arbitrage opportunities. Indeed, if 
corporate income would be taxed lighter than non-corporate income, people would have an 
incentive to become entrepreneur, while entrepreneurs would have an incentive to incorporate 
so as to reduce their tax liability.  
Yet, decisions on legal form of business are not only made on the basis of tax. For instance, 
some businesses organized in the corporate form may collect substantial non-tax benefits, such 
as gains from limited liability or the advantage of attracting capital. Others may incur costs 
from incorporation, e.g. due to capital requirements or legal obligations. Non-tax costs and 
benefits should therefore be weighed against the net tax advantage of corporate versus non-
corporate income. Empirical evidence should guide us on how large the effects of taxation are. 
A modest literature has explored the impact of taxes on the choice of legal form. Most of 
these studies use statutory corporate tax and top personal income tax rates as proxies for the tax 
burden on corporate and non-corporate income. Earlier studies reviewed in e.g. De Mooij and 
Nicodeme (2008), find that the effects of taxation are small, suggesting that non-tax factors are 
more important in determining legal form. Most of these studies use time series variation to 
identify the impact of tax. Goolsbee (2004) criticizes this approach as the variation in tax rates 
over time is small, making it difficult to properly identify tax effects. Goolsbee (2004) then uses 
cross-section data for US States and industries in the retail trade sector in 1992. He explores the 
impact of taxes on several indicators of the size of the corporate sector, including the share of 
companies, employment and sales. His estimates suggest a larger semi-elasticity of the 
corporate tax base with respect to the corporate tax rate than earlier studies: εOF = − 0.4. De 
Mooij and Nicodeme (2008) use a panel of European data on the corporate share of companies 
and the corporate share of employment in different European countries between 1997 and 2003. 
In different specifications and for different indicators, they report a semi-elasticity of around 
−1.0. As a best-guess, we take an average of the results of Goolsbee and De Mooij and 
Nicodeme: εOF = − 0.7. It implies that a 10%-point higher tax rate on corporations would ceteris 
paribus reduce the corporate share of business, and therefore the corporate tax base, by 7%. 
2.2 5BFinancial structure 
While interest on debt is deductible from the corporate tax base as a cost, the return on equity is 
generally not. As a result, debt is almost everywhere tax favoured relative to equity. It induces 
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firms to increase their leverage, thereby causing an erosion of the corporate tax base and a 
distortion in asset portfolios. Recent financial innovations − such as the arrival of hybrid 
financial products − seem to have increased this financial arbitrage. 
The question is how large the impact of corporate taxation is on a firms’ financial policy. On 
the one hand, the optimal source of finance generally depends on various non-tax factors, such 
as the risk of bankruptcy in case of the high debt ratio, or the importance of financial distress or 
agency costs. Moreover, thin capitalization rules may put limitations on the use of debt finance. 
On the other hand, taxes may create a substantial advantage of debt over equity, thereby 
affecting a firms’ financial policy. 
A number of studies aim to identify the impact of taxation on the financial leverage of firms. 
Graham (2003) reviews several studies. He concludes that most studies using time series data 
report small tax effects. A problem of these studies is, however, that identification is difficult in 
light of the small variation in tax rates over time. More recent studies using cross-section 
variation between companies typically report larger effects. For instance, Gordon and Lee 
(2001) exploit the variation in statutory tax rates between small and large companies in the US 
and find that a 1%-point increase in the corporate tax rate raises the debt/asset ratio at the 
margin by 0.36%-point, i.e. εDE = − 0.36. 
Thin capitalization also matters for financial structures within multinational firms. 
Headquarters investing in subsidiaries abroad can choose between debt and equity finance and 
the tax burden affects this choice of finance. When financed by debt, the interest is deductible 
for the subsidiary in the host country and taxed in the home country of the parent. When 
financed by equity, the dividend of the subsidiary is taxed at the rate of the host country and 
repatriated dividends are usually untaxed in the country of the parent (if that country uses an 
exemption system which is the case in continental Europe). To minimize the tax liability, a 
parent company will therefore prefer debt finance for subsidiaries located in high-tax countries 
and equity finance for subsidiaries in low-tax countries. Recent empirical studies explore the 
impact of taxation on the financial policies of multinationals, thereby using cross-country 
variation in tax rates. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) use data on foreign affiliates of US 
multinationals and estimate εDE = − 0.4. Desai et al. (2003) arrive at εDE = − 0.25. Huizinga et al. 
(2006) disentangle the domestic leverage effect and the international debt shifting effect and 
report semi-elasticities of 0.18 and 0.12, respectively. This would mean an overall value of εDE 
= −0.3. We consider − 0.3 as the consensus estimate for the financial decision margin. It means 
that, if a corporate tax rate is 33%, removing discrimination would reduce the debt/asset ratio 
by 10%-point. The debt-equity response only matters for the normal return to capital, not for 
economic rents. We have no information, however, about the appropriate shares of normal 
returns and economic profits, i.e. of wN. By assuming a share of one half for the normal return, 
we obtain for the relevance of the financial distortion that wN εDE = − 0.15. 
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2.3 6BProfit shifting 
Across countries, taxable income of a multinational is divided among its affiliates on the basis 
of separate accounting. It means that the accounts of each affiliate terminate at the border (the 
water’s edge) and that profits within these borders are taxed according to the rules and the rate 
of the country where the subsidiary resides. This allocation of profits on the source basis is 
often arbitrary, however. For instance, where should the multinational allocate shared costs and 
returns? And how should it value intrafirm deliveries or services? Due to this arbitrariness, 
multinationals have opportunities to manipulate this allocation and reduce the overall tax 
liability of the company. Separate accounting indeed allows for international tax arbitrage, 
which erodes the base of a nation’s corporate tax.  
One important route for shifting multinational profits is the manipulation of transfer prices. 
Following the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, transactions between entities of a 
multinational company in different countries should be traded on the basis of arms-length 
prices, i.e. prices that would apply to market transactions between unrelated parties. For a 
number of goods and services, however, there is no outside market. The uniqueness of many 
intangibles, such as brand names and intellectual property rights, makes it impossible to 
determine arms-length prices. It leaves the freedom for multinationals to determine their own 
prices on a discretionary basis. By charging an artificially low price for goods that are 
transferred from high-tax to low-tax countries, a multinational can reduce its overall tax 
liability. 
There is a rapidly growing literature showing that international profit shifting is an 
important phenomenon with big implications for government revenues. The character of these 
studies is diverse, however, which makes it difficult to infer a comparable indicator of the effect 
size. For the purpose in this paper, we rely on a handful of studies estimating the impact of 
statutory tax rate differentials on measures of profitability. The results of these studies are 
usually interpreted as indirect evidence of profit shifting. De Mooij (2005) summarizes these 
studies and reports that, on average, studies yield a semi-elasticity of εPS = − 2. This semi-
elasticity should be pre-multiplied by the share of multinational firms to which the reported 
elasticities apply. Using information from the ORBIS database, we find that this share (although 
it differs substantially across countries) is around 60% on average in Europe. Thus, the strength 
of the impact of profit shifting on the corporate tax base would be: wM εPS = − 1.2.  
2.4 7BInvestment 
Neo-classical theory suggests that investment is driven by the Jorgenson concept of the cost of 
capital. The idea is that firms accumulate capital as long as the return to investment exceeds the 
cost of finance and depreciation. Due to decreasing returns to scale, there is a marginal project 
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that just breaks even, i.e. which earns a return that precisely matches the costs. In the presence 
of taxation, the pre-tax rate of return on the marginal investment project is defined as the cost of 
capital.  
To determine the effect of corporate taxes on investment, we need to asses: (i) the impact of 
the corporate tax on the cost of capital and (ii) the impact of the cost of capital on investment. 
The first effect depends on the corporate tax system. For instance, the more generous tax 
depreciation allowances or investment tax credits are, the smaller is the impact of taxes on the 
cost of capital. This impact is reflected by the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), which is 
defined as the difference in the cost of capital in the presence and in the absence of tax, in 
percentage of the pre-tax cost of capital. On the second effect, there are two strands of empirical 
literature. One directly estimates the elasticity of the cost of capital on investment. Hassett and 
Hubbard (2002) review this literature and conclude that an elasticity between − ½ and − 1.0 is a 
good reflection of it. Alternatively, one can divide the substitution elasticity between labour and 
capital by the labour income share in production to infer the investment elasticity of the cost of 
capital indirectly. Chirinko (2002) provides a careful assessment of this empirical literature and 
concludes that a value between 0.4 and 0.7 is most plausible for the substitution elasticity. 
Assuming a labour income share of 80%, we again obtain an elasticity of investment to the cost 
of capital between − ½ and − 1.  
From the definition of the EMTR, we can derive for the semi-elasticity of investment (I): 
EMTR
EMTR
cLogILog Δ−=Δ=Δ 1)()(
αα  (4) 
where α stands for the investment elasticity of the cost of capital (i.e. the value between − ½ and 
− 1). A number of studies have computed EMTRs using information from tax codes. They 
usually report positive values for equity-financed investment but negative values for debt-
financed investment (which is due to the deductibility of nominal interest). The weighted 
average of the EMTRs is usually reported to be positive. Its value is generally small, however. 
For an EMTR of say 10%, the semi-elasticity of investment to the EMTR, i.e. εINV, lies in the 
range of − 0.55 to − 1.1. As a best-guess, we take the average: εINV = − 0.8. To determine the 
strength of the investment response for the aggregate corporate tax base elasticity, we pre-
multiply this semi-elasticity with the share of normal returns in the corporate tax base. Taking 
wN = 0.5 and assuming that these returns are taxed (i.e. that they are financed by equity), we 
obtain wN εINV  = − 0.4. 
Foreign investment 
A share of total investment comes from abroad and is denoted as foreign investment. There are 
some special features of foreign capital flows that justify a separate analysis. As there is a large 
 7 
literature on the specific impact of taxation on foreign capital flows, we can also infer from this 
to what extent the impact on total investment is determined by foreign capital flows.  
There are two alternative views on how corporate tax policies affect cross-border 
investment. The first view is the neoclassical approach, which follows the same logic as above. 
Assuming that capital is mobile across countries, investors will seek the most profitable 
investment opportunities across the globe. This ultimately equalizes the after-tax rates of return 
in all locations. The relevant tax for investors in deciding about the size of their foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is then the EMTR. It applies to, for instance, multinationals that have already 
established foreign subsidiaries and who decide on how much to invest in each of these 
locations.  
The second view considers discrete location choices. It may apply to investments that are 
lumpy. Alternatively, it can be relevant for multinationals that earn a firm-specific economic 
rent. For instance, (quasi) rents associated with patents, brand names, know-how or market 
power, are typically mobile across borders. A firm earning such a rent can decide on the 
location of its plant based on the total tax bill. For this decision, the average effective tax rate 
(EATR) on corporate income matters, not the EMTR. Indeed, the higher is the tax burden on 
the income earned in a location, the lower is the probability that a firm will locate its plant. 
These alternative theories are not necessarily conflicting. Indeed, firms may first decide on 
the location of their plants and then, conditional on location, determine the amount of 
investment. For the first choice, the EATR matters; for the second choice the EMTR matters. It 
leaves open the question what we can say about the most relevant decision margin. How 
sensitive are the intensive and extensive investment margins to corporate tax? Which part of the 
corporate tax system (and, therefore, which indicator of tax) induces the largest behavioural 
effects? Empirical evidence should guide us to the most likely answers. We discuss this in the 
next section. 
3 2BA META ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
ELASTICITIES 
There is a large empirical literature exploring the impact of corporate taxes on international 
capital flows. The typical study regresses a measure of the company tax burden on a measure of 
foreign capital flows or stocks, thereby controlling for other factors affecting investment. 
Surveys by Hines (1999), Devereux and Griffith (2002) and De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) 
conclude that according to this literature, company taxes have a significant effect on foreign 
investment.  
The literature is heterogeneous in a number of respects. First, studies adopt alternative 
measures of capital: some use aggregate data on FDI (time series, cross section and panels), 
others rely on measures for property, plant and equipment (mainly US investment abroad), and 
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again others adopt count data on the number of foreign locations. Second, studies use different 
measures of the tax burden: some use statutory corporate tax rates (sometimes for US states on 
inward investment), others rely on the EMTR, the EATR, or average tax burdens computed 
from micro or macro data. Finally, studies differ in their way of identifying the tax effect on 
investment. For instance, some consider the tax regime in the country where the parent 
company resides (credit or exemption), some studies differ in the control variables they use, and 
researchers use different theoretical specifications and econometric methodologies. 
This section uses a previously constructed meta sample on the semi-elasticity of foreign 
investment (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003) to assess the most relevant decision margin for 
international firms, i.e. marginal investment versus discrete location. We extend the previous 
analysis in two directions. First, we add six recent studies to the sample. Second, we 
concentrate on a particular classification of studies regarding the use of capital data and the use 
of tax indicators. In particular, the focus is on the difference in effect size for location choice 
versus marginal investment choice. Since meta analysis is not common in economics, we first 
briefly review the pros and cons of this methodology. 
3.1 8BMeta analysis 
Meta-analysis is a research method to synthesize research results. It is best seen as a statistical 
approach towards reviewing and summarizing the literature. It can alternatively be described as 
the “analysis of analyses”. As a research method, it has a longstanding and by now fairly strong 
position in psychology, education, and medical research. Meta-analysis provides a tool to 
compare and/or combine outcomes of different experiments with similar set-ups or, 
alternatively, differences in set-ups that can be controlled for. As such, it enables the researcher 
to draw more rigorous conclusions than would have been possible on the basis of either of the 
studies considered in isolation. 
Virtues of a meta analysis 
Although meta analysis has been developed for sciences with an experimental setting, the 
methodology can be also employed in economics (see Florax et al. (2002) for a more elaborate 
discussion). In this connection, meta analysis should be seen as a complement to a traditional 
literature review. Indeed, compared to an ordinary survey, meta analysis has some distinct 
potential advantages. First of all, meta-analysis constitutes a more systematic approach towards 
analysing the sources of (quantitative) variation in previously obtained research results. The 
underlying studies in the literature are often difficult to compare because of different 
specifications, different data and different methodologies, as is the case with taxation and FDI. 
The statistical nature of meta analysis implies that it compares studies in a systematic way. 
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Secondly, meta-analysis is more ‘objective’ than the traditional literature review, although it 
is not necessarily free from subjectivity either. Indeed, each literature survey is characterized by 
a selection process. This is justified to the extent that the quality of studies differs. The main 
advantage of meta analysis as compared to a literature review is that it makes the selection 
process verifiable since the meta analyst has to be explicit on his selection criteria. 
Thirdly, meta-analysis opens up the possibility of investigating non-sampling issues such as 
research design, model specification and estimation technique, which are usually relatively 
constant within a study. The multivariate set-up of meta regressions allows for the assessment 
of marginal effects of study characteristics, everything else remaining constant.This yields 
useful information for both future research and economic policy. Indeed, it adds knowledge to 
economic science by assessing the systematic impact of the underlying differences in study 
characteristics on the variation in estimates of the effect size.  
Fourthly, given its quantitative orientation meta-analysis usually goes beyond what is called 
vote-counting. Vote-counting is often, more or less implicitly, used in literature reviews. It 
refers to simply counting and tallying significant results of a specific sign as well as zero-
results. The inference that a specific category occurs in a majority of cases is usually taken as 
evidence for the size and direction of the ‘true effect’. Vote-counting is, however, not very 
powerful in coming up with the right conclusion. It tends to result in a bias towards drawing the 
conclusion that the estimated relationship under consideration is statistically insignificant. It is 
especially prone to suggesting the wrong conclusion when the number of available studies 
increases. 
Problems with meta analysis 
Meta-analysis is not free from problems. A first and rather obvious problem is how to attain a 
representative sample of the literature. Modern bibliographical tools, such as EconLit and other 
(online) databases, and the easy availability of working papers through the Internet, do not 
prevail that it may be difficult to assess whether the sample of studies is in the end 
representative of the population of studies. Even more aggravating is the possibility that the 
studies that have been published constitute a biased sample of what has actually been found by 
researchers. For instance, editors of journals could have a tendency to reject ‘negative’ or 
insignificant results. This may also lead to self-censoring so that negative results are put away 
in the file drawer and even do not appear in unpublished working papers. Research results 
found in the literature are then necessarily biased towards significant ‘positive’ results, and a 
meta-analysis would thus be concerned a biased representation of what has been published. This 
problem of publication bias, however, also applies to ordinary literature surveys. One advantage 
of meta analysis, is that the researcher can test for the presence of publication bias in a certain 
literature. 
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A second problem of meta analysis is concerned with the comparability of estimated effect 
sizes. This is not always straightforward. For instance, elasticities estimated using a double 
logarithmic specification are generally different from point elasticities evaluated at the sample 
mean of taxes and quantities. There is no a priori preference for one or the other, and it is 
impossible to favour either of them on the basis of statistical or theoretical arguments. 
Alternatively, elasticities may be different in their time horizon (short vs. long-run elasticities), 
or even more complex, their base may be different. In a strict sense, the elasticity estimates 
obtained by different methods are incomparable. This is not necessarily detrimental to 
performing a valid and thorough meta-analysis. Indeed, a meta analysis can explore whether 
such differences systematically matter for effect sizes. 
A third problem is related to the formidable heterogeneity among studies. In medicine and 
the sciences replication is a common characteristic. In economics, on the contrary, it seems to 
be a common desideratum of research that the investigator be ‘original’ and ‘innovative’. As a 
result, it is not straightforward to account for all this heterogeneity, and many meta-analysts rely 
on simple fixed or random effects to account for such differences. Two circumstances aggravate 
this problem even further. One is common to all research: how to account for quality 
differences among studies? In economic meta-analyses this is usually not addressed, except for 
the variation in precision of effect sizes due to differing sample sizes of the underlying studies. 
In principle, meta analysis can explicitly allow for quality differences between studies. The 
problem is, however, that it is inherently difficult to use objective quality indicators to weigh 
the different observations. Therefore, meta analysis cannot fully replace a literature review in 
which the subjective judgement of the reviewer regarding quality of primary studies is 
important. The other problem is more typical of economic research: in contradistinction to 
experimental sciences, economists are generally rather ‘sloppy’ in adequately reporting 
statistical results as well as providing sufficient information about the statistical characteristics 
of the sample observations. Although providing insufficient or incomplete information may not 
be all that relevant for the study as such, it is extremely relevant for the comparison of results 
among different studies, and it is of paramount importance for a proper and justifiable 
construction of a good database. 
A final problem, common to meta-analyses in the experimental sciences as well as the non-
experimental sciences, concerns the assumption of independence of the observations. In the 
(experimental) sciences this assumption can usually be defended because the tradition of doing 
replications makes that one estimate per study can be sampled, without running into degrees of 
freedom problems. In economics, however, the generally much more limited number of 
available studies, which as a rule provide various ‘competing’ specifications, necessitates the 
meta-analyst to sample more than one observation per study. As these observations are derived 
from the same data, the lack of independence is obvious. The potentially negative effects of this 
problem (e.g., biased estimates in the meta-analysis) are usually simply disregarded.  
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All of these problems are increasingly recognized in the community working on meta-
analysis. Fortunately, this results in the development of new, and more sophisticated techniques 
(e.g., multilevel techniques, and tests and estimators taking into account publication bias), to 
cope with the potentially negative effects of disregarding these problems inherent to meta-
analysis. This is of course of paramount importance for the validity and the credibility -- and in 
the end, as a result, the acceptance -- of a relatively new technique, such as meta-analysis. 
Since there is an abundance of (primary) empirical studies, meta analysis could easily be 
applied to taxation and FDI. Estimating just one other elasticity usually has a small value added 
to the literature. In that case, a meta regression may be a good alternative: it combines all the 
available information and comes up with summary statistics that can be useful for policy 
makers that are interested in ‘consensus estimates’. Moreover, meta regressions can yield 
important information about factors driving the variation in study results.  
3.2 9BThe meta data base 
In De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), we collected several estimates on the impact of taxation on 
foreign investment. For each study, the marginal coefficient was transformed into a uniformly 
defined semi-elasticity, which measures the percentage change in FDI in response to a 1%-point 
change in the tax rate (i.e. ∂ln(FDI)/∂t). To be able to transform marginal coefficients from 
studies into semi-elasticities, information was often required about the mean value of the FDI 
variable or the tax rate. Only if this information was available, an estimate was included in the 
meta sample. Also information was collected on whether a tax coefficient was significant at the 
5% confidence level. We arrived at a total sample of 371 elasticities but excluded some extreme 
values which left us with 351 observations. Using regression analysis, we explained the 
variation in semi-elasticities by the variation in the underlying study characteristics.  
This paper adds 78 new elasticities from six recent studies.F3F We eliminate outliers, which 
we define as observations that are outside the range of plus and minus two times the standard 
deviation from the mean. In this way, especially negative outliers that cause a skewed 
distribution are eliminated from the sample.F4F We end up with a meta sample of 427 
observations which is used in this paper. Figure 1 shows the distribution of these semi-
elasticities. The x-axis shows intervals of values for the semi-elasticity and the y-axis shows the 
number of observations in each of these intervals. 
 
3 The studies are Buettner (2002), Desai et al. (2004), Benassy-Quere et al. (2003), Stoewhase (2003, 2005) and Buettner 
and Ruf (2004). They are discussed in more detail in De Mooij and Ederveen (2006). 
4 Most of these outliers are reported in older studies using time series of panel data. Including the extremes considerably 
increases the coefficient for exemption systems as the large negative outliers refer to those countries. The significance of 
some tax measures becomes weaker but do not change signs. For an analysis of the influence of outliers, see De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2003). 
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Figure 1 Distribution of semi-elasticities 
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The mean value in the sample is − 3.3, i.e. a 1%-point increase in a tax measure in a certain 
location reduces foreign capital by 3.3%. The distribution is somewhat skewed to the left due to 
some large negative values. The median is therefore smaller: − 2.9. The standard deviation of 
4.4 suggests that the variation across studies is large.  
An important issue in meta analysis is the quality of the primary studies. Ordinary literature 
surveys usually provide a subjective judgement of the quality of studies which contains 
important value added for the reader. The reviews by Hines (1999) and Devereux and Griffith 
(2002) reflect on this in more detail. In meta analysis, one may take into account quality 
differences by weighting observations with standard errors of the estimated coefficients. The 
problem in our meta sample is, however, that the required standard errors are often missing. 
Therefore, we do not account for quality differences. 
3.3 10BSpecification 
We estimate an equation of the form y = βX + ε, where y represents the vector of semi-
elasticities, and X is a matrix of dummy variables reflecting various study characteristics. The 
information about study characteristics is contained in the meta database, usually in form of 
dummies that indicate whether a certain characteristic applies to an estimate or not. The 
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parameter β thus measures the systematic impact of each study characteristic on the reported 
semi-elasticities in the literature. In the regressions, we control via dummy variables for the 
following underlying characteristics of an estimate.F5F  
 
• Data characteristics, including type of capital and time; 
• Type of tax used in the regression; 
• Background variables, such as the regime for double-tax relief in the parent country 
(exemption or credit) and source of finance (retained earnings or transfers). 
Table 1 summarises our classification of the types of capital data and types of tax measures. It 
shows the number of semi-elasticities based on a certain category as well as the number of 
significant semi-elasticities. 
With respect capital data, we distinguish between studies using financial data on the amount 
of capital invested in each location, and studies using count data on the number of locations. 
While the former best relate to marginal investment, the latter better measure discrete location 
decisions. If the two types of data yield the same effect sizes, the effects of taxation on 
investment might be entirely driven by discrete choice. If capital data yield larger elasticities, 
however, the amount of capital is likely to be responsive as well. Table 1 shows that about one 
third of the sample consists of semi-elasticities based on number of locations and about two-
thirds is based on financial investment data. 
Among the studies using financial data, we distinguish two categories: data on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and US data on property plant and equipment (PPE). The latter is thought to 
be more closely related to real capital investment. The studies using count data are divided into 
three categories: those making no distinction as to what type of locations are counted and those 
based on either new plants/plant expansions or mergers and acquisitions. For mergers and 
acquisitions, the impact of taxes can be very different than for greenfield investment (see e.g. 
Scholes and Wolfson, 1990). In particular, a higher tax in the host country can make foreign 
ownership more attractive because, in contrast to local owners, foreign owners can be shielded 
from the higher tax rate by the credit system in the home country (as e.g. applied in the US and 
the UK). 
 
5 In De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), we have reported the systematic impact of other sources of variation. For instance, we 
analyse the difference between unpublished and published studies, variation in the specification of the estimated equation 
(linear, logarithmic, quadratic), variation in estimation techniques (OLS, IV, other) and the type of data (panel, cross section, 
time series). Regarding the latter, note that studies using panel or time series data largely coincide with FDI.  
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Table 1 Summary information meta database: study characteristics, observations and significance 
 
Number of 
semi-elasticities 
Number of significant  
semi-elasticities 
Capital data   
Financial data   
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 208 115 
Property plant & equipment (PPE) 73 45 
Count data   
Number of  locations 68 32 
Number of new plants/plant expansions 43 15 
Number of mergers & acquisitions 24 7 
Other 11 7 
All 427 221 
   
Type of tax data   
Effective marginal tax rate 74 35 
Approximation average tax   
Country statutory rate 29 14 
Statutory rate in US states 133 48 
Effective average tax rate 36 29 
Micro tax rate 94 67 
Macro average tax rate 61 28 
All 427 221 
   
Source of finance   
Retained Earnings 39 18 
Transfers 84 47 
Mixed 304 156 
System for double tax relief   
Exempt 162 60 
Credit 118 67 
Mixed 147 94 
 
With respect to tax data, we distinguish between estimates based on the EMTR and those 
determined by an indicator for the average tax burden. The former include studies that estimate 
the impact of the cost of capital, from which we derive the semi-elasticity of the EMTR. The 
EMTR measures incentive effects on marginal investment decisions. The EATR can be written 
as a weighted average of the EMTR and the statutory corporate tax rate and measures both 
investment responses and location decisions. If the EMTR yields systematically lower 
elasticities than the EATR, it indicates that taxes matter more at the extensive margin than at the 
intensive margin. In the meta sample, we have 74 estimates using the EMTR. Other estimates 
are based on average tax rate measures.  
Among the studies using the average tax, 36 estimates use ex-ante EATR computations 
along the lines of Devereux and Griffith (1998). These studies show the highest rate of 
significant semi-elasticities (over 80%). In the US context, 133 estimates use State statutory tax 
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rates, which approximate average effective tax rates in the US rather good due to the common 
federal base. Other studies either use either country statutory tax rates (29) or average tax rates 
computed from firm accounts (94) or macro data (61).  
Apart from differences in capital data and tax measures, we include three other study 
differences in our meta regressions. The first is the source of finance (retained earnings versus 
transfer of funds). The second refers to the system of double tax relief used in the home country 
of the investor. Under the exemption system, foreign income is exempt from taxation in the 
home country of the parent so that the tax in the host country matters for the return on the 
investment. Under the credit system, in contrast, tax liabilities in the host country of the 
subsidiary are credited against taxes in the home country of the parent. In that case, the ultimate 
tax burden on investment is determined by the tax rate of the home country of the parent. The 
tax in the host country is then expected to matter less. In the meta sample, 162 semi-elasticities 
apply to countries where the investor is located in an exemption county, 118 apply to credit 
countries and for the other estimates the country of the investor is unknown. The final variable 
that may affect reported semi-elasticities is time. To the extent that capital has become more 
mobile over time, one may expect that taxes exert a larger impact on international investment. 
However, time may also reflect an improvement in the quality of data or econometric 
techniques to identify the impact of taxes. 
3.4 11BMeta regressions 
Table 2 shows the outcome of two meta regressions. The coefficients show the effect of 
particular study characteristics, relative to a benchmark. The benchmark refers to a study using 
FDI data, the EMTR, an unspecified source of finance or system for double-tax relief and no 
post 1980 data. For presentational convenience, we have put a minus sign for all semi-
elasticities before doing the regression analysis. Thus, we transformed most semi-elasticities 
into positive figures. A positive coefficient for a dummy variable therefore means a higher 
elasticity in absolute terms, i.e. the semi-elasticity becomes more negative. Both regressions in 
Table 2 use the entire meta sample excluding outliers. They differ in the study characteristics 
included. 
Table 2 shows a significant negative coefficient for Number of locations. Hence, studies 
relying on count data produce significantly smaller semi-elasticities than studies relying on FDI. 
It suggests that not only the decision to locate, but also the decision on the amount of capital 
invested is responsive to tax.  
For studies using financial data, PPE tends to produce larger semi-elasticities than FDI. One 
explanation is that PPE better reflects greenfield investments, which depends on location 
advantages. FDI contains also investment through mergers and acquisitions on which higher 
taxes exert an opposite effect due to the ownership advantage. Another explanation might be 
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that PPE data only exist for US investment and that capital flows into and out of the US are 
relatively sensitive to taxes. With the meta analysis, we cannot distinguish between these two 
explanations. 
Table 2: Meta regression results 
 (1) (2)
Constant: FDI & EMTR 2.77 (0.50)** 2.51 (0.91)** 
Capital data (relative to FDI) 
Property Plant Equipment 2.00 (0.54)** 1.99 (0.67)** 
Count data  
Number of locations − 2.22 (0.63)** − 2.72 (0.81)** 
Locations – Plants − 0.40 (0.76) − 0.59 (0.90) 
Locations – M&A − 9.90 (0.81)** − 10.09 (0.94)** 
Tax measures (relative to EMTR) 
STR in US states 3.14 (0.81)** 3.26 (0.90)** 
STR in countries − 1.13 (0.54)** − 1.57 (0.60)** 
EATR 2.35 (0.66)** 1.88 (0.75)** 
Micro ATR − 0.15 (0.70) − 1.16 (0.81) 
Macro ATR − 0.30 (0.79) 0.67 (0.94) 
Other characteristics of the data (relative to mixed data) 
Retained Earnings  0.02 (1.16) 
Transfers  -1.00 (0.69) 
Exemption country  0.98 (0.57)* 
Credit country  0.34 (0.69) 
Post 1980 data  -0.36 (0.91) 
Post 1990 data  1.88 (0.49)** 
Regression statistics 
Observations  427 427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.36 
Durbin-Watson  1.50 1.54 
a Semi-elasticities are pre-multiplied by − 1 before regressions were run. Coefficients reflect the difference in semi-elasticity 
relative to the benchmark set of study characteristics, which is FDI data and the EMTR. Standard errors between brackets, *  
and ** denote statistical significance at 10% and 5% level, respectively. We include a special dummy for investment into 
Belgium and for capital data used in Swenson (1994) which is different from the other categories of capital data.  
 
Among the studies using count data, those referring to plants (new plants and plant expansions) 
produce larger semi-elasticities than those referring to number of locations. It provides further 
support that location choices are relatively responsive to tax. Count data on mergers and 
acquisitions yield semi-elasticities with an opposite sign. It confirms that higher taxes in host 
countries make it more attractive for capital to be foreign owned due to the tax shelter provided 
by credit systems.  
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The benchmark study uses the EMTR as the indicator for the corporate tax burden. Table 2 
reveals whether the average tax burden produces different outcomes. For the EATR, the meta 
regressions suggest a positive effect. Hence, lumpy investment or discrete location choices 
tends to be more responsive to tax. Note that a relatively large number of studies using the 
EMTR (or cost of capital) produce insignificant semi-elasticities: 39 out of 74 based on the 
EMTR are insignificant; for the EATR this is only 7 out of 36.  
Studies using country statutory tax rates produce significantly smaller semi-elasticities than 
studies using the EMTR. Hence, statutory tax rates are probably a poor indicator to measure the 
impact of corporate tax systems on investment. This does not apply to state statutory tax rates 
in the US, however. Indeed, the semi-elasticity from studies using this tax indicator is usually 
larger than from studies using the EMTR. It may indicate that differences in state statutory tax 
rates in the US form a relatively good approximation for the differences in average effective tax 
rates. 
Table 2 shows that studies based on average tax rates computed from data do not yield 
different semi-elasticities from studies using the EMTR. In estimating elasticities, however, 
average tax rates suffer from possible endogeneity problems while they do not measure the tax 
burden on future but on past investments. Therefore, they are less appropriate indicators to 
measure investment incentives.  
The coefficient for tax exemption countries is weakly significant and positive. The 
coefficient for credit countries is insignificant. It suggests that investment from exemption 
countries tend to be more responsive to tax than investment from credit countries, which is 
consistent with the theory.  
The coefficient for post 1980 data in Table 2 is insignificant. For post-1990 data, we find a 
positive coefficient. The interpretation of this result can be twofold. On the one hand, it may 
provide evidence for a growing responsiveness of capital to taxation over time. This is 
consistent with the results reported by Altshuler et al. (2001) who find that elasticities obtained 
from a cross-section for the 1980s were considerably smaller than those obtained from a cross-
section for the 1990s. On the other hand, the higher elasticities may also reflect changes in the 
quality of estimates over time, e.g. due to better data and advances in econometric 
methodologies. The meta analysis is unable to distinguish between the two. 
3.5 12BPredicted semi-elasticities  
From the meta regressions in Table 2, we can infer fitted values for the semi-elasticity of 
foreign investment under a particular set of study characteristics. Table 3 presents such 
predicted values for two types of capital data and three alternative tax measures. Thereby, we 
take the regression results from the second column of Table 2. In computing the predicted 
values, we set dummies on credit/exemption and retained earnings/transfer of funds equal to 
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zero. The post-80 and post-90 dummies are set equal to one. In Table 3, we present semi-
elasticities with their original sign, i.e. no longer pre-multiplied by − 1. 
Table 3 Predicted semi-elasticities using the meta regressions of Table 2 
 Financial data Count data on number of locations 
Effective marginal tax rate − 4.0 − 1.3 
Effective average tax rate − 5.9 − 3.2 
Country statutory tax rate − 2.4 0.3 
 
Table 3 shows that the typical semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to the EMTR is − 4.0. 
Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006) present data on the foreign ownership share of capital in 
European countries (i.e. the share wF) and report an average of 20%. Hence, the 4% inflow of 
capital in response to a 1%-point reduction in the EMTR will raise the aggregate capital stock in 
a country by 0.8%. The corresponding semi-elasticity of the tax base via an inflow of foreign 
capital would require pre-multiplying this by the share of the normal return, which we assume 
to be 0.5. Hence, wF.wN.εFDI  = 0.4. This is equal to the tax base elasticity of investment as 
reported above. It suggests that all additional capital invested in response to a reduction in the 
cost of capital comes from abroad. This is consistent with perfect capital mobility.  
The predicted semi-elasticity of the EATR is − 5.9 when applied to financial data. It 
suggests that the extensive margin of investment matters more than the intensive margin. 
However, the impact of the EATR on financial data captures both marginal and discrete 
investments. To isolate the impact on the extensive margin of investment, we take the impact of 
the EATR on the number of locations, i.e. the semi-elasticity of −3.2. To determine the semi-
elasticity of the tax base via discrete location choices, this should be pre-multiplied by the share 
of foreign capital of 20%. Thus, we obtain for the semi-elasticity of the tax base: wFεLOC  = 
−0.65. This effect comes on top of the impact via marginal investments.  
It is tempting to compare our predictions based on meta regressions with recent findings in 
the literature that are not included in the meta data base. It shows another way of how our meta 
analysis may be used in assessing new evidence. We discuss four such studies. First, Devereux 
and Lockwood (2006) estimate the long-run semi-elasticity of investment using financial data 
for three alternative indicators of tax. For the EATR the results suggest a statistically significant 
semi-elasticity of − 1.5. For the EMTR (derived from the cost of capital measure), the 
corresponding value is − 0.5 but insignificant. For the statutory tax rate, the semi-elasticity is 
−0.9, but this coefficient turns insignificant when also the EATR is included in the regression. 
The values of these semi-elasticities are somewhat lower than previous findings. The relatively 
large value for estimates based on the EATR are consistent with the outcome from the meta 
analysis. Bellak and Leibrecht (2008) estimate the semi-elasticity using FDI flows into Central 
and Eastern European countries. They consider two alternative tax variables. For the EATR, 
they report a significant semi-elasticity of − 4.3. For the statutory tax rate, the result becomes 
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insignificant and the semi-elasticity drops to − 1.9. This comes close to our predictions from the 
meta regressions. Bellak et al. (2008) estimate similar equations but concentrate on the impact 
of labour costs on FDI. The estimated semi-elasticity of the EATR in their study lies between 
−4.3 and − 4.7. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) use a panel of FDI and estimate the impact of either 
the statutory corporate tax rate or the EATR using a double log specification. Their estimates 
suggest a significant semi-elasticity of the statutory corporate tax between − 4 and − 6, which is 
relatively large compared to previous findings. The semi-elasticity of the EATR is a bit higher 
at a round − 6.  
4 3BCONCLUSIONS 
How large are distortions of corporate taxes at various decision margins? By reviewing and 
using existing empirical evidence, this paper computes for five decision margins the semi-
elasticity of the total corporate tax base. Table 4 summarizes our assessment. It suggests that 
empirical studies on profit shifting yield the largest tax base elasticities. Also studies on 
international investment responses yield substantial effects, both via marginal investments and 
especially via discrete location decisions. A few studies suggest that distortions on legal form 
might be substantial too. The reported semi-elasticity for financial leverage is relatively small. 
The five responses to tax cannot be simply added since they depend on different tax measures. 
If the different tax measures would all increase by 1%-point and we ignore interactions between 
responses, we would arrive at an aggregate effect on the tax base of − 3.1. This comes close to 
the aggregate Laffer-curve estimates by Clausing (2007). 
Table 4 Semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base for five decision margins 
Behavioural margin Relevant tax Effect size  
1. Organisational form Corporate vs. personal tax − 0.7  
2. Financial policy Debt/equity discrimination − 0.15  
3. Profit shifting Statutory tax rate − 1.2  
4. Investment – intensive EMTR − 0.4  
5. Investment – extensive EATR − 0.65  
 
The relatively large elasticity of profit shifting may explain why countries engage in fierce 
competition with their statutory tax rates in order to attract multinational profits. Indeed, we 
observe a steady decline in these rates over the last few decades (see e.g. Loretz, 2008). 
Moreover, the large investment responses may explain why governments engage in tax 
competition for mobile capital. Especially average effective tax rates seem to have been falling 
over the last decade, which is well understood by the large elasticity of discrete locations.  
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From a normative perspective, the outcomes provide an argument for a neutral tax treatment 
of incomes earned in different legal forms. Moreover, they offer an argument in favour of tax 
harmonisation if governments would seek to minimize fiscal spillovers via profit shifting and 
international investment distortions. As long as this harmonisation is not achieved, they 
rationalize a country’s policy of corporate tax rate reduction, possibly combined with base 
broadening or shifting to other taxes. 
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